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Abstract 
Motivational interdependence is an organizing principle in Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex 
model of social values, which has received abundant cross-cultural support (Schwartz et al., 
2012). We used fMRI to test whether motivational relations between social values predict 
different brain responses in a situation of choice between values. We hypothesized that 
differences in brain responses would become evident when the more important value had to 
be selected in pairs of congruent (e.g., wealth and success) as opposed to incongruent (e.g., 
curiosity and stability) values as they are described in Schwartz’s model, because the former 
serve mutually facilitating motives, whereas the latter serve mutually inhibiting motives. 
Consistent with the model, choosing between congruent values led to longer response times 
and more activation in conflict-related brain regions (e.g., the supplementary motor area, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) than selecting between incongruent values. These results 
provide novel neural evidence supporting the circumplex model’s predictions about 
motivational interdependence between social values. In particular, our results show that the 
neural networks underlying social values are organized in a way that allows activation 
patterns related to motivational similarity between congruent values to be dissociated from 
those related to incongruent values.  
Keywords: Human values; Schwartz’s value model; Supplementary motor area; Dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; fMRI. 
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Many aspects of human behavior are guided by social values, which determine what we 
consider important and which goals we choose to pursue (Rokeach, 1973). Social values (e.g., 
freedom, authority) are conceptually distinct from economic values (i.e., reward associated 
with a specific choice option), which have been the subject of extensive research in the fields 
of human decision-making, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics. Economic values 
reflect the computation of choice propensities that are attached to specific stimuli (or 
responses, rewards) in a given situation. In contrast, social values can be seen as 
transsituational goals that vary in importance between individuals and serve as general 
guiding principles across contexts (Schwartz, 1992) and are intrinsically linked to the self-
schema (Brosch & Sander, 2013).  
  In particular situations, usually involving reward or altruistic decisions, social and 
economic values can engage the same or overlapping brain areas, such as the mesolimbic 
reward system (VTA-striatum) (Moll, Krueger, Zahn, Pardini, de Oliveira-Souza, & Grafman, 
2006), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & 
Rangel, 2010) or the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Brosch, Coppin, Scherer, Schwartz, & 
Sander, 2011). It has been suggested that social values may exert their effects on decisions 
and behaviors via modulations of the neural regions involved in the computation of economic 
values (Brosch & Sander, 2013). 
 A critical advance in research on social values was Schwartz’s (1992) proposition that 
it is important to model the motivational interdependence among values. The starting point for 
this model was the assumption that values are representations of three universal requirements 
of human beings: biological needs of individuals, coordinated social interactions and societal 
demands for group welfare and survival (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). The 
motivational types of values were derived from these three universal human requirements and 
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thus reflect a joint function of social normative influence and personal priorities. Indeed, 
Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, and Sagiv (1997) showed that the whole motivational 
continuum described by the value circle was coherently related to socially desirable 
responding (measured with The Marlowe-Crowne scale). The correlations between social 
desirability and value priorities contributed to the validation of the value measurement.  
 Schwartz’s (1992) model postulates a continuum of 10 motivational value types, 
which underline decision-making, attitudes and behavior, constituting an important organizing 
principle of both the individual’s life and the functioning of society as a whole. According to 
Schwartz, the pursuit of a particular value has consequences compatible with some values but 
incompatible with others. As shown in Fig. 1, adjacent types share compatible motivations, 
those on opposite sides of the circle serve incongruent motivations, while orthogonal ones are 
in between. For example, the pursuit of novelty and change (stimulation values) is likely to 
undermine preservation of time-honored customs (tradition values), while it can amplify 
creativity and freedom (self-direction values). 
Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992) model of values. Value types are presented inside the circle. Higher 
dimensions of motivational aims are shown outside the circle. 
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The circumplex model has been highly influential in social and cultural psychology. It 
has been cited in over 50,000 publications used to help integrate diverse findings in studies of 
emotions, attitudes and behavior relevant to cultural psychology, intergroup behavior, 
personality, and political psychology (Boer & Fischer, 2013). Furthermore, supportive 
evidence for motivational interdependence between values as postulated by the circumplex 
model exists at the behavioral level (e.g., Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009; 
Boer & Fischer, 2013; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 
2007; Pulfrey & Butera, 2013), including evidence of genetic contributions (Knafo & Spinath, 
2011; Schermer, Vernon, Maio, & Jang, 2011).  
However, these behavioral findings rely on the correct identification of value-relevant 
behaviors, which is problematic if more than one value is promoted by a behavior (which is 
often the case). For this reason among others (e.g., behavioral measurement reliability, 
paucity of studies with multiple behavioral variables at once), it is important to further test the 
motivational relationships between values as delineated in the circumplex model, and 
triangulation with other types of data. The inclusion of neuroimaging data would be 
particularly useful because it can identify cognitive and emotional processes without relying 
on participants’ self-reports or inferences from overt behavioral data.  
Of importance, the aim here is different from simply identifying neural networks 
involved in the representation of social values. Research has already made strides in mapping 
these networks. For instance, increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex and dorsal 
striatum were found during "core value" computations, while value ratings correlated with 
activity in the precuneus and anterior prefrontal cortex (Brosch, Coppin, Schwartz, & Sander, 
2012). Others have investigated the neural basis of moral sentiments like pride and guilt, 
gratitude and indignation/anger in the context of social values expressed by social concepts 
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such as generosity and stinginess (Zahn et al., 2009). The authors demonstrated that regions in 
the superior anterior temporal lobe, which represent abstract social concepts, were recruited 
during emotional judgment of social values and were stable across different contexts of moral 
sentiments. The authors showed that context-dependent moral sentiments were encoded in 
fronto-mesolimbic regions. That is, pride correlated with activity in the septum, the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA), the parahippocampal gyrus, and the anterior ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. Guilt was associated with activity in the anterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex as 
well, and also in subgenual cingulate cortex; indignation/anger activated the orbitofrontal 
cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the insula; gratitude correlated with 
hypothalamus activation. Other commonly studied social concepts whose neural underlying 
systems have been mapped include moral cognition and altruism (e.g., Moll, Zahn, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005;  Moll et al., 2006); the former was related to 
activation in cortical-limbic networks including the prefrontal cortex, anterior and posterior 
temporal cortex, and limbic/paralimbic structures, and the latter to the mesolimbic reward 
system (VTA-striatum), the orbitofrontal cortex/subgenual cingulate, and the anterior 
prefrontal cortex. 
Although these studies help to outline the neural networks involved in values, they do 
not address the neuronal signature of the motivational conflicts in Schwartz's social value 
types. This question was the focus in the present research. Specifically, we used functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test whether the circumplex model’s predictions about 
value congruence versus incongruence are supported at the neural level. If the circumplex 
model’s predictions about motivational conflicts between values are correct, then there should 
be higher conflict (in the sense of mentally struggling to choose between two alternatives, 
either desirable or undesirable) evoked by choices between congruent values versus 
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incongruent values. Selecting between congruent as compared to incongruent values should 
entail more psychological conflict, because the former serve mutually facilitating motives, 
whereas the latter serve mutually inhibiting motives (Bardi et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 
2012). Incongruent values are inherently contrasted and those who emphasize a specific value 
tend to de-emphasize the opposing value (e.g., Borg, Bardi, & Schwartz., 2015; Sverdlik, 
2012). Therefore, in cases that contrast incongruent values, individuals tend to show a clear 
preference of one value over the contrasting one, so they experience less psychological 
conflict. Furthermore, even in cases where the preference is equivalent, there can still be more 
subjective conflict with motivationally opposing values than congruent values (Maio, 2010; 
Pakizeh et al., 2007). Consistent with these observations and rationale, we expected to see 
activation in brain regions associated with conflict processing in a situation of choice – when 
one value had to be selected as more important from two motivationally congruent values 
versus two motivationally opposing (incongruent) values. 
Prior theory and evidence points to specific regions as being important in the processing 
of psychological conflict. An important role in detection of conflict and in conflict monitoring 
has been assigned to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), in a model proposed by Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001). According to this model, the ACC is not only 
involved in the detection of conflict but its activation also signals a demand for increased 
control to meet tasks demands. One could thus predict that the crosstalk among pathways 
processing different values may thus constitute a conflict that is detected by the ACC 
mechanism.  
Neuroscientific evidence examining psychological conflict has supported a role for the 
ACC, as well as for the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the supplementary motor 
area (SMA). This research has relied on classic conflict paradigms, such as moral dilemma 
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situations, moral judgements, Stroop tasks, go/no-go or stop-signal tasks. For instance, high 
conflict between self-interest and collective interest in the Prisoner's dilemma game was 
associated with increased activity in the ACC and DLPFC (Emonds, Declerck, Boone, 
Vandervliet, & Parizel, 2012). In another interesting example of a psychological conflict in a 
moral dilemma situation, the ACC and DLPFC exhibited increased activity during difficult as 
compared to easy personal moral judgments (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 
2004). More specifically, utilitarian judgments that violated personal norms but were 
perceives as "appropriate" led to increased activity in brain regions associated with cognitive 
control, particularly in the DLPFC, relative to non-utilitarian judgments perceived as 
“inappropriate”.  
The importance of the DLPFC in psychological conflict is consistent with additional 
evidence looking at value-based decisions. For instance, a distinctive pattern of prefrontal 
activation was found in a study in which value-based decisions in conflict situations were 
investigated in individuals with either a predominant collectivistic (altruistic) or 
individualistic (egocentric) value system (Caspers et al., 2011). Both collectivists and 
individualists recruited the DLPFC equally strongly, yet individualists additionally activated 
the medial superior frontal cortex, while collectivists showed increased engagement of the 
middle cingulate cortex. The DLPFC was also important in a study by Christensen, Flexas, de 
Miguel, Cela-Conde, and Munar (2014), who found that the DLPFC, temporal poles and 
posterior cingulate cortex were activated during utilitarian but not during deontological moral 
judgments in Catholics. Deontological moral judgments likely involved less cognitive/
psychological conflict compared to utilitarian judgments because they are based on rules and 
norms rather than on anticipated consequences (as utilitarian norms). 
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 The SMA is important because successful goal-directed behavior requires the selection 
of an appropriate response for the task at hand, while stopping an inappropriate response. 
Stopping a selected (by a participant) action and specified (by an experimenter) action recruits 
the SMA, indicating that this area supports both action selection and stopping and thus helps 
to resolve conflict between competing available responses (Rae, Hughes, Weaver, Anderson, 
& Rowe, 2014). Recent findings support the view that the SMA plays a central role in conflict 
resolution and encodes response alternatives as opposed to simply the presence of conflict 
(Fedota, Hardee, Pérez-Edgar, & Thompson, 2014). In a go/no-go task, the SMA was 
activated in response to both go and no-go stimuli, but with a different activation pattern 
associated with these the two stimuli, which supported a direct role for the SMA in response 
selection. Thus, the SMA may be involved in the representation and maintenance of task sets 
and response alternatives as a final step before motor program execution (Banich, 2009). 
 In our experimental paradigm, we expected that forced choice between motivationally 
congruent (and thus either similarly compelling or similarly undesirable) values would 
produce conflict and therefore engage some of the above mentioned brain areas. To test this 
hypothesis and thus a central assumption in Schwartz's model, we presented participants with 
pairs of motivationally congruent or incongruent values. Participants were asked to choose as 
quickly as possible the more important value in each pair, while we recorded response times 
and brain activation using fMRI. 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-three healthy participants (16 women, 7 men, mean age 26.1 years, age range 19-48 
years) were paid (15 GBP) for taking part. They were all right-handed, white-British 
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university students or community residents from Cardiff (Wales) and had normal or corrected 
vision. The sample size was established before the start of data collection. Following previous 
social neuroscience studies (Cloutier & Gyurovski, 2014; Zelinková et al. 2014), we aimed 
for a sample size of 20 to remain after allowing for a 15% rate of data loss, insufficient data 
quality, or exclusions. Therefore, we tested 23 participants.  
The research project was approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at Cardiff University and carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.  
Stimuli  
Participants were presented with 60 pairs of values randomly sampled across nine value types 
in Schwartz’s (1992) circular model (Fig. 1): universalism, benevolence, tradition, 
conformity, security, power, achievement, stimulation, and self-direction. (One value type 
[hedonism] was not included because it shares elements of two motivational dimensions and 
therefore could not be used to test our hypothesis.) Each type contained five mainly original 
Schwartz’s value items (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012).  
Following Schwartz’s value model, we systematically created pairs of values, such 
that each pair was categorized as either congruent (compatible) or incongruent (conflicting). 
We presented 20 pairs per condition. The congruent value types were conformity and security, 
power and achievement, stimulation and self-direction, universalism and benevolence; the 
incongruent value types were benevolence and achievement, conformity and self-direction, 
security and stimulation, power and universalism (Table 1, Fig. 1). In addition, we included 
20 pairs of orthogonal values for follow-up tests of the extent to which the differences 
between congruent and incongruent values might be more strongly attributable to either or 
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both motivational pairings: these orthogonal value types were benevolence and security, 
power and stimulation, stimulation and universalism, tradition and power (Table 1, Fig. 1). 
Results of those additional tests are presented and discussed in the supplementary material. 
Specific items (e.g., cleanliness) from within each value type were sampled randomly. No 
value pair was presented repeatedly to a subject. 
 To match phrase length across conditions, seven of the original Schwartz’s items 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012) had to be modified. For example, we presented 
meeting social expectations instead of behave properly/avoid doing anything people say is 
wrong and stability instead of stability of society. These minor adjustments preserved the 
value meanings and are unlikely to have evoked differences in basic value activation. Stimuli 
were matched for word length across conditions: mean character counts including spaces were 
identical for congruent and incongruent values (13.6, 95% CI [11.8, 15.4]) and comparable 
for orthogonal values (15.6, 95% CI [13.6, 17.5]), F(2,78) = 2.25, p = .113. The values in a 
pair were presented simultaneously one above the other at the centre of a black screen in 
white letters. The screen at the rear of the MRI bore was viewed through a mirror mounted on 
the MRI head coil. 
Procedure 
Participants were screened for fMRI safety hazards and familiarized with the task. The 
scanning session started with an instruction displayed on the monitor: "You will see a 
sequence of value pairs. For each pair, decide as quickly and accurately as possible which 
value is more important as a guiding principle in your life". Participants were asked to give 
their responses by pressing the left or right button on a response box with their left or right 
index finger, respectively. Each trial began with a gray fixation cross having a random 
!12VALUE CONFLICT IN THE BRAIN
duration of either 4, 6, or 8 s (Fig. 2), which was used as fixation baseline in fMRI data 
analyses (see below). A value pair was then displayed for 4 s before the next trial started. The 
order of value pairs was freely randomized. Each participant completed 60 trials, which lasted 
about 610 s in total, including the instruction display. Additionally, to monitor the potential 
motor effect of button pressing force, which could differ in the three conditions, pressure 
sensors (water-filled detector pads) were mounted on the response buttons to measure 
response force (RF), as an indicator of motor activation. It is possible that the congruence 
conditions could evoke motor activation of varying intensity, which might lead to differences 
in RF, thus affecting brain activity. To exclude this potential motor cofound, we examined if 
our experimental conditions were related to RF differences. Due to technical reasons, pressure 
data could be recorded from a subgroup of 17 of the 23 participants only. Response force was 
recorded with the Spike2™ software (CED, Cambridge, UK).  
Figure 2. Experimental paradigm. While undergoing fMRI scanning, participants were asked to 
choose as quickly and accurately as possible which of two simultaneously presented values was more 
important for them as a guiding principle in their life. Each trial began with a fixation cross of 4, 6, or 
8 s duration, followed by a value pair displayed for 4 s. Three types of pairs were randomly presented: 
motivationally incongruent, congruent and orthogonal value pairs (see figure for examples). 
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fMRI data acquisition 
FMRI images were acquired using the 3.0 Tesla General Electric Medical Systems Signa HDx 
at Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre (CUBRIC). Blood-oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) signals were measured during the experimental task using a T2-weighted 
gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence that was synchronized to the onset of the task 
(the first trial) and covered the whole brain. Each volume (whole brain coverage) contained 
35 slices of 3-mm thickness, with 1-mm inter-slices spacing (parameters: voxel size = 3 x 3 x 
3 mm3, matrix size = 64 x 64; field of view = 192 x 192 mm, time repetition = 2000 ms, time 
echo = 35 ms, flip angle = 80°). A total of 304 volumes per participant were acquired, 
yielding a total scanning time of 608 s.  
Also, we obtained 3D high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images of the whole 
brain immediately after functional scanning using a fast spoiled gradient echo sequence 
(FSPGR) with 190 contiguous axial slices and an isotropic voxel resolution of 1 mm (time 
echo = 3 ms, inversion time = 450 ms, flip angle = 15o, field of view = 256 x 256 mm).  
Data analysis 
Behavioral data  
For each condition and participant, we computed mean response time (RT, N = 23) and 
mean response force (RF, N = 17). RFs were calculated based on the peak force amplitude 
after stimulus presentation. All responses before onset of the next value pair were included to 
compute RTs and RFs. Mean RTs and RFs were submitted to paired samples t-tests. Effect 
sizes for significant differences between conditions were calculated using Cohen's d for paired 
samples (d = D / SDD, where D is the mean difference score and SDD is standard deviation of 
the difference scores). Data are presented with 95% confidence intervals.  
!14VALUE CONFLICT IN THE BRAIN
fMRI data 
Data analysis was conducted using the BrainVoyager QX™ software (Brain 
Innovation, Maastricht, the Netherlands). FMRI data preprocessing included 3D motion 
correction for head movements, slice scan time correction and temporal filtering to remove 
signal drifts (high pass filter of 0.006 Hz). Functional images were realigned (coregistered) to 
participants’ anatomical images and normalized to Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 
1988). 3D functional images were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full 
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 4 mm. 
 Statistical fMRI analysis was performed using standard general linear model (GLM) 
approaches (N = 22, one participant was excluded due to technical problems during data 
acquisition). Based on stimulus onsets and offsets of each value pair, we defined three 
predictor functions to regress BOLD signal changes elicited by the presentation of each of the 
three experimental conditions. The predictor time courses were convolved with a 
hemodynamic response function to account for the hemodynamic delay of the BOLD signal. 
Our task predictor modeled both stimulus (value) processing and motor processes, which are 
not separable in time with the resolution of the fMRI signal. Moreover, we refrained from 
including RTs as a separate predictor, because effects of conflict and prolonged stimulus 
processing (RT delays) were inherently linked in our paradigm (see also discussion).  
However, to control for non-specific motor effects that are not related to conflict processing 
we added RF as a parametric predictor in additional parametric analyses (N = 17). In these 
analyses, we tested if and where in the brain RF modulated the effects of condition (main 
predictor) using whole-brain conjunction analyses of the main predictors and the de-meaned 
RF predictor. 
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 For each participant and predictor, regression coefficients (beta estimates) were 
extracted. To generate multi-subject brain activation maps, we then entered individual beta 
estimates into whole-brain random effect analysis. Specifically, we aimed to identify brain 
regions showing significant differences for the comparisons between congruent versus 
incongruent pairs using t-tests. We followed-up with additional comparisons (presented in 
supplement) between both sets of values and the orthogonal values.  
To control for multiple comparisons in voxel-based whole-brain analyses, we used a 
cluster-level statistical thresholding approach, which calculates - for a targeted p-value and 
given volumetric activation map - a minimum cluster size using iterative Monte Carlo 
simulations (Forman, Cohen, Fitzgerald, Eddy, Mintun, & Noll, 1995). We considered voxels 
within clusters to be significantly activated only when they survived the estimated threshold/
cluster size. Here, cluster thresholds were calculated based on activation maps at an 
uncorrected (voxel-based) p-level of p < .005 and resulted in a cluster-corrected p-level of p < 
.05, and a cluster threshold level of 351 voxels (1x1x1 mm) for the congruent versus 
incongruent contrast. Thresholded activation maps with significant clusters were converted 
into brain regions of interests (ROI) and subjected to detailed ROI analysis. For each ROI, we 
extracted cluster size (in 1x1x1-mm voxels), mean beta weights, and t-values for specific 
contrasts, which were z-transformed to allow for comparisons between ROIs. 
RESULTS 
Behavioral data 
Response time  
On average, there were fewer than two missed responses per participant. Replicating 
past evidence (Pakizeh et al., 2007), paired-samples t-test showed that participants took 
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longer to select the more important value in pairs of congruent (M = 2149 ms; SD = 462 ms) 
as compared to incongruent values (M = 1964 ms; SD = 389 ms), t(22) = 3.68, p = .001, 
Cohen’s d = .77 (Fig. 3).  
Figure 3. Mean response times (RTs; left) and the mean of RT difference (right) when participants 
were selecting the more important value in pairs of congruent (Con) or incongruent (Incon) values. 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals (paired data). 
Response force  
Paired-samples t-test showed no difference in RF between congruent and incongruent 
conditions, t(16) = -0.04, p = .970. 
Brain imaging data 
One participant was excluded from fMRI analyses because of technical problems during data 
acquisition. Whole-brain analyses using RF as an additional parametric modulator did not 
show any significantly activated brain regions, suggesting that the effects described below 
were not attributable to between-condition differences in RFs. 
Whole-brain analysis identified several brain regions in the left frontal lobe showing 
larger activation when participants were asked to choose between two congruent versus two 
incongruent values (Table 2, Fig. 4). As expected, the active regions were those that have 
been previously identified as being important in the processing of psychological conflict. The 
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largest activation cluster was found in the SMA, other clusters were located in the DLPFC, 
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), and in the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). Stronger 
activation in the congruent versus incongruent condition was also found in the right inferior 
semi-lunar lobule (ISLL) of the cerebellum. The exploration of activation levels in these areas 
across conditions revealed that, in both conditions and in all regions, brain activity increased 
relative to the fixation baseline; yet, this increase was significantly more pronounced when 
subjects were choosing between congruent values. Mean beta weights in the identified 
clusters, indicating relative activation levels in the two conditions (congruent or incongruent 
pairs), are shown in Fig. 5. 
Figure 4. Brain regions showing larger activation in the congruent versus incongruent condition. SMA 
= supplementary motor area; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC = ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex; IFJ = inferior frontal junction; ISLL = inferior semi-lunar lobule; SAG = sagittal 
view; COR = coronal view; TRA = transversal view; A = anterior; P = posterior; R = right; L = left. 
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Figure 5. Mean beta weights in brain regions where stronger activation was found for congruent 
versus incongruent value pairs. Betas (corresponding to relative activation levels) of single conditions 
are shown at the left and beta differences between the conditions at the right. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals (paired data). SMA (L) = left supplementary motor area; DLPFC (L) = left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC (L) = left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; IFJ (L) = left inferior 
frontal junction; ISLL (R) = right inferior semi-lunar lobule; Con = pairs of congruent values; Incon = 
pairs of incongruent values; Con vs Incon = difference between the two conditions. 
DISCUSSION 
Despite evidence of attitudinal and behavioral implications of motivational conflicts between 
human values, research has not previously examined whether signatures of value conflict are 
also detectable at the neural level. Choices between values should reveal heightened activity 
in brain regions implicated in conflict resolution, but more so when the choices involve two 
motivationally compatible rather than opposing values. The present study tested whether 
Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of values is capable of identifying the value choices that 
lead to more activation in regions that have been linked to processing conflict (e.g., Caspers et 
al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2014; Fedota et al., 2014; Rae et al., 2014). Supporting the 
model, choosing between values that it identifies as serving congruent motives led to more 
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activation than choosing between values that it identifies as serving incongruent motives. This 
difference arose within several regions previously linked to processing conflict, the left SMA, 
DLPFC, and VLPFC, as well as in the left IFJ and the right cerebellar ISLL.  
The SMA is involved in situations of response conflict, like motor response inhibition 
in the go/no-go and stop-signal tasks (Fedota et al., 2014; Rae et al., 2014). It is activated 
when cognitive requirements are complex, and SMA activity is mainly driven by increased 
attentional and working memory load, not by response inhibition per se (Criaud & 
Boulinguez, 2013). This corroborates the results of our study, where cognitive demands 
including attention and self-reflection are likely to have been high and a 4-s response window 
allowed the completion of meaningful decisional processing (see Pakizeh et al., 2007).  
The DLPFC has been associated with BOLD activity related to “cognitive” conflict, such as 
response inhibition, conflict monitoring or task switching (Gläscher et al., 2012), but also 
with “social” conflict as studied in moral dilemma tasks. Referring to the latter, the DLPFC 
was engaged in responding to difficult as compared to easy personal moral dilemmas, in 
which utilitarian values require “personal” moral violations (Greene et al., 2004), and in 
utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas (Christensen et al., 2014). 
Moreover, and consistent with our results, Caspers et al. (2011) found increased DLFPC 
activation during value-related conflicts when participants had to reject a value that was 
congruent with their own value orientation. Similarly, neural correlates of norm compliance, 
which involved the requirement to curb immediate self-interest in order to obey a fairness 
norm under the threat of punishment, included activation of the DLPFC, and VLPFC (Spitzer, 
Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 2007). 
Conflict-related effects were also reported in the VLPFC, where Sommer et al. (2010) 
found higher activity during moral relative to “neutral“ conflicts. Moreover, both the DLPFC 
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and VLPFC have contralateral projections to the cerebellar ISLL (Krienen & Buckner, 2009). 
We therefore speculate that the present activation in the right cerebellum may be related to the 
left prefrontal effects.  
We observed activation in the IFJ , a region adjacent to the middle DLPFC (BA 46 and 
9) (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & von Cramon, 2005). Some researchers have argued for a 
structural and functional distinction between the IFJ and the DLPFC in cognitive control 
(Brass et al., 2005). The authors suggest that the IFJ plays an important role in cognitive 
control tasks, such as task switching and Stroop tasks. In a meta-analysis comparing Stroop 
tasks, two areas in the fronto-lateral cortex showed a consistent activation: the IFJ and middle 
DLPFC (Neumann, Lohmann, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005).  
A central role in the detection and monitoring of conflict is often assigned to the ACC 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). ACC activation has been associated with tasks requiring the 
participant to override relatively automatic but task-inappropriate responses (Swick & 
Jovanovic, 2002) or to select among equally dominant (allowed) responses (Barch et al. 
2001), tasks leading to the commission of errors (Carter et al., 1998; van Veen & Carter, 
2006), or difficult, as compared to easy, personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004). The 
question arises why we did not observe ACC activation in our congruent condition in which 
participants had to choose between almost equally dominant response options (i.e., none of 
the values was more compelling than the other). One tentative account for this divergence is 
that tasks for which ACC activation has been reported typically require choices where 
“dominant” responses in prior tasks have a different meaning than here. The congruent values 
are associated with high importance but are not automatic elicitors of some pre-potent 
response (as in cognitive conflict tasks), and have to be compared in order to make a decision. 
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This deliberative comparison process is inherently different from the control-focused tasks 
usually linked to ACC activation. 
The DLPFC and VLPFC have been shown to be interconnected in humans (Goulas, 
Uylings, & Stiers, 2012; Morawetz, Bode, Baudewig, Kirilina, & Heekeren, 2015). Direct 
connections between the SMA areas and both the DLPFC and cingulate areas have also been 
established (Lu, Preston, & Strick, 1994; Luppino, Matelli, Camarda, & Rizzolatti, 1993; 
Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008), with much stronger intrinsic connections from the 
DLPFC to SMA than from the SMA to DLPFC (Morawetz et al., 2015), The SMA makes also 
a direct and substantial contribution to the corticospinal tract, and termination patterns of 
SMA corticospinal cells resemble those of primary motor cortex projections, suggesting that 
these SMA cells make direct connections to motor meurons (for review see Nachev et al., 
2008). Thus, considering the anatomical connections of the DLPFC and SMA and the existing 
conflict and cognitive control hypotheses, it seems conceivable that a conflict signal reached 
the DLPFC (and VLPFC) which exerted cognitive control to overcome the conflict (Barch, 
Braver, Sabb, & Noll, 2000; Carter et al., 1998; Carter & van Veen, 2007), possibly via the 
SMA. The SMA plays a central role in conflict resolution and encodes response alternatives 
as opposed to simply the presence of conflict (Fedota et al., 2014). The SMA is theorized to 
implement the appropriate tasks sets as performance demands evolve (Dosenbach et al., 
2006). As the response set is accessed, the differentiated response representations encoded in 
the SMA are activated as part of a direct conflict resolution mechanism (Petersen & Posner, 
2012). Thus, the SMA may be involved in the representation and maintenance of active task 
sets and response alternatives as a final step before motor program execution (Banich, 2009). 
As in all studies that link brain activity with particular psychological constructs, it is 
important to consider potential alternative interpretations of the psychological processes 
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putatively revealed by the brain activity. One alternative interpretation is relevant to our 
finding that, as expected, RTs were longer when participants were selecting a value which was 
more important to them as a guiding principle in their lives from pairs of congruent values as 
opposed to pairs of incongruent values, which was previously observed by Pakizeh et al. 
(2007). The question arises whether these RT effects reflect a mere “distance effect”, which is 
usually found in cognitive comparison tasks wherein participants are faster to compare items 
that differ more on a given dimension (Ogata, Horaguchi, Watanabe, & Yamamoto, 2011). In 
Schwartz’s circular model, greater distance does not signify greater difference as much as it 
signifies motivational opposition. The circular arrangement of values in the model represents 
a motivational continuum from congruence to antagonism: the closer any two values, the 
more congruent their underlying motivations, and the more distant any two values, the more 
antagonistic their underlying motivations. In fact, the opposing values are similar insofar as 
they reside on opposite ends of the same motivational dimension. This motivational 
opposition, which also entails self-reflection and moral judgment, is therefore distinct from 
the manipulations of distance in much simpler cognitive comparison tasks (e.g., when 
selecting the larger of two letters). Moreover, distance effect tasks engage parietal and 
temporal regions, with a central role typically assigned to the intraparietal sulcus (IPS; 
Mussolin, Noël, Pesenti, Grandin, & De Volder, 2013). We did not find activation differences 
in the IPS, suggesting that conflicting processing related to values can be neurally dissociable 
from conflict processing related to cognitive/perceptual comparisons. 
Another potential interpretation of our findings is that the present BOLD effects 
(especially the increase of frontal activation) simply reflected increased attention and 
prolonged stimulus/motor processing in high-conflict trials. Thus, the frontal activity patterns 
may have been caused by differences in task difficulty (and associated changes in executive 
!23VALUE CONFLICT IN THE BRAIN
control), rather than a psychological conflict per se (Shenhav, Straccia, Cohen, Botvinick, & 
2014). Such concerns have recently been raised in relation to work showing that comparing 
economic values in reward-based decision making, namely the choice between engaging in a 
given option and searching for alternatives, leads to distinct activation in the ACC (Kolling, 
Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012). Further, Yarkoni, Barch, Gray, Conturo, and Braver 
(2009) demonstrated that the longer it takes an individual to respond, the more activation is 
seen in a given brain region, especially when participants are experiencing increased task 
difficulty or conflict. Critically, in contrast to choices based on economic values, our task 
entails no “optimal” or objectively correct choice; instead value comparisons and associated 
conflicts are idiosyncratically defined by each individual’s value hierarchy, which in turn 
mitigates confounds from general task difficulty. However, we acknowledge that in our task 
“subjective difficulty” and psychological conflict were inherently linked. That is, the 
difficulty of choice increased when the conflict entailed in choosing between two “similarly” 
important values increased.  
Finally, the absence of response force differences between conditions adds further 
support to the notion that RT and brain activation effects were caused by differences in 
psychological conflict and not by differences in motor processes, and we should note that 
semantic relatedness was not a major factor in influencing RTs. Previous research has found 
that judgments of semantic relatedness were independent of RT effects (on speed of rating of 
the second value in a pair) in a similar experimental paradigm presenting pairs of congruent, 
incongruent, and orthogonal values (Pakizeh et al., 2007). 
It is worth noting that Schwartz recently added other principles into the structure of 
relations among values proposed in his original model (Schwartz, 2012). He recognized 
interests that are served by value attainment, such as personal or social interests, and relations 
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of values to anxiety and self-protection, such as anxiety-based/self-protection or anxiety-free/
self-expansion values. In our study, we decided to examine motivational conflicts based on 
the two original dimensions in Schwartz's model. Yet, it would be interesting in future 
research to explore the neuronal basis of these additional dimensions, which also place values 
on opposite ends in the value circle. Some neuroimaging evidence for the relevance for these 
dimensions indicates that the activation pattern in the left posterior insula differentiates 
between the processing of self-protection and self-expansion values (Brosch et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, as described in our introduction, prior analyses have not looked at the neural 
associates of value conflict, which is the novel contribution from our research. By looking at 
value conflict across two dimensions of the circle, while yielding evidence converging with 
prior studies of psychological conflict, our findings make it seem likely that similar results 
will arise if we look at other dimensions within the circle (i.e., rotated 45 degrees). This is an 
interesting question for future research. 
In summary, our results provide novel evidence for differences in neural responses to 
human values as a function of their motivational compatibilities/conflicts, particularly as 
described within Schwartz’s model (1992, 2012). This model has received abundant cross-
cultural support, but it had been unclear whether the motivational relations between values 
predicted by the model might have a theoretically consistent neural signature. Our fMRI 
results thus extend behavioral evidence in support of Schwartz’s model by identifying neural 
signatures of value conflict and may provide a useful neuroscientific paradigm for future 
research manipulating and measuring motivational connections between values. 
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TABLE 1 
Values types used in the study 
Motivational 
type
Value (stimulus) Motivational 
type
Value (stimulus)
Power authority Benevolence dependability
being the leader faithfulness to friends
preserving my public image forgiveness
social power helpfulness
wealth honesty
Achievement achievement Conformity fitting in with my group
ambition following rules
aspiration meeting social expectations
competence obedience
success politeness
Stimulation a varied life Tradition acceptance of family beliefs
an exciting life commitment to family 
religion
novelty and change preservation of customs
seeking adventure respect for tradition
taking risks traditional culture 
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Self-
direction
choosing own goals Security avoiding danger
creativity avoiding sickness
curiosity cleanliness
freedom security
independence stability
Universalism care for environment
equal opportunity for all
protection of the weak
tolerance
world peace
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TABLE 2 
Brain regions showing larger activation for congruent versus incongruent value pairs 
 
Notes: BA = Brodmann area; mean coordinates = Talairach coordinates of a cluster's center of 
gravity; cluster size = number of 1 x 1 x 1-mm voxels in a cluster; t-value = t-value of the 
contrast congruent versus opposing pairs; L = left hemisphere; R = right hemisphere; SMA = 
supplementary motor area; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC = ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex; IFJ = inferior frontal junction; ISLL = inferior semi-lunar lobule. 
Brain region BA Mean coordinates of the 
activation cluster Cluster size t-value 
  x y z   
SMA (L) 6 -8.3 0.3 55.2 1420 4.817 
DLPFC (L) 6 -48.5 5.6 47.3 812 3.852 
VLPFC (L) 45 -51.4 21.1 17.9 523 4.464 
IFJ (L) 9 -43.4 3.73 32.2 380 3.933 
Cerebellum: ISLL (R)  23.6 -72.5 -38.4 635 4.262 
 
